Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)There are many good insights and much worthwhile information here. But there is no apparent organization of ideas, either among the chapters, within a chapter, within a page or sometimes within a paragraph. Ideas and facts are presented, and repeated later, as if this were several slightly different articles on the same subject laid end-to-end. We are told about the movie "Helldivers" at least twice, for instance, and both times it is introduced as if new; and many times it is repeated that the Royal Navy did not have an institutional way of resolving technical aviation issues, while the USN had an interaction among BuAer, the War College and Fleet exercises. This repetition (in a book of only 200 pages) masks the fact that there is not really a book's worth of information here, and that and the poor organization mean that many important questions just aren't brought up (like, just how were the personnel policies for Naval Aviators decided? What actually were the options considered at various points in time?). It also masks some flaws in logic: the authors are fond of saying that the interwar navies were like cash-strapped gamblers in a casino, who could not afford to lose, and so spread their bets evenly. Apart from the implicit assumption that a rich man can afford to lose everything, this is an excellent way to military disaster, making onself weak everywhere; and it is not explained how refusing to make a choice among options is actually making a choice. Neither is the book particularly well-written; in too many places I had to go over again a sentence or paragraph, trying to figure out just what the authors were trying to say. "Related to the concept of cost is that of risk"--immediately after two paragraphs apparently discussing risk. This book might be useful to find some facts and ideas not otherwise immediately available; or, I would hope, as an inspiration for a more thorough and organized study.--CDR, USNR, ret.
Click Here to see more reviews about: American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919-1941
The development of aircraft carriers and carrieroperations sparked a revolution in military affairs, changingcompletely and irrevocably the prosecution of war at sea. Previousstudies and histories of carrier aviation have focused on just one ortwo factors, such as individual leadership or advances in aviationtechnology, to explain the development of carrier forces. By contrast,this new history compares the development of carriers and carrieraircraft by two very different navies to illuminate the many factorsthat effect the adoption of new military technology.Focusing on the critical years after World War I, the authors tracethe personal, organizational, and institutional elements that movedthe U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy along different paths of aircraftcarrier development and operations. In a clear, almost conversationaltone the authors draw on years of research to explain why and how theRoyal Navy lost its once considerable lead in carrier doctrine andcarrier aircraft development to the Americans in the years after 1919.Originally asked to produce a study for the Office of the Secretary ofDefense that would maximize the value of decreasing defense fundsthrough wise investment in new technologies, the authors revised andexpanded that work after a wide-ranging, international search forpreviously unused primary sources. This new effort offers bothcompelling history and a trenchant essay on how and why militaryorganizations adopt and develop revolutionary technology. Itsunconventional approach should appeal to readers interested in modernnaval history and in revolutions in military affairs.
Click here for more information about American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919-1941
0 comments:
Post a Comment