Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)This book is basically a self-help book for naval officers. As such, I guess the author mostly wants to reach out to:
1) Youngsters considering a naval officer career
2) Cadets
3) Active-duty officers whose careers may not be going as planned
Of course, people may also buy the book for interest value, but I'm hardly the guy he needs to reach out to...
If that's the goal, the author fails miserably. While there are a few interesting factoids on what to expect, they are for the most part predictable and I'm not even in the USN, so I predict there is little new to the serving officer or even cadet. The only somewhat useful discussion is on the merits of going to graduate school vs instructor vs 2nd sea tour. For stuff like Joint Tours and Foreign Tours, the discussion can be summarized as "If you want to promote, take it when you have the chance."
The main message can be summarized as to Work Hard, Be Honest and Take Responsibility. Gee, I need to buy a book to tell me that.
But what sinks the book from Mediocrity to Bad is its handling of "horror story" situations. Common to the 3 categories of readers I mentioned above is that they may have read horror stories about the shortcomings of the USN's centralized personnel system. For the last category, they may already perceive themselves as the protagonist of yet another horror story. One of the major tasks of this book is clearly to refute the horror stories, and it really falls down here.
Except for admitting that some branches (such as amphibious warfare) are indeed disadvantaged in the promotion stakes, plus a symbolic admission that the Bureau of Personnel is not quite perfect, he blames the victim and classifies them as part of the bottom side of the pack. He mentions that their reports are satisfactory or even good by any "absolute standard", but lack "sparkle". He also refers to the "detailing casualties" and claims that the USN goes to extraordinary efforts to accomodate the personal needs of offices.
It may even be true, but when I read that, I recall the horror stories, and cynically think whether the "sparkle" he mentioned is the difference between "Outstanding" & "Excellent" or getting a score below the "98th percentile". And I'm not even a victim. I can only conclude that RADM Winnefeld had not learned, despite long service, that you don't get through to people by blaming them, insisting that they are uninformed, or by telling them to just suck the disappointments up and continue to work hard.
The poor defense is exacerbated by the author's 3 tours in Bureau of Personnel, thus further stripping his defense of credibility. Overall, I won't be surprised if a reader's belief in the horror stories is AFFIRMED through reading the book. As such the book is an utter failure.
Though it almost doesn't matter, it all tops off in a section that marks the author as an arrogant dimwit. Rear Admiral Winnefeld, while I'm willing to buy that USN personnel average better than their Soviet counterparts, there were PLENTY of reasons why the Soviets did not field a carrier battle group, and why US submarines often have an edge - in fact, especially for the 1st case, personnel quality differences probably rank close to last among the reasons. Your attempt to imply it is a primary reason does you no credit, as is your attempts to disparage the upcoming PLA Navy on what seems to be horribly limited information.
In short, it is so bad, it rates as anti-propaganda. The USNI should stop publishing this, to avoid further damage to the USN.
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