From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) Review

Average Reviews:

(More customer reviews)I was a Sonar Technician on a Franklin Class Polaris boat armed with A-3's from '69-'71. The essential FBM systems were reasonably mature by the time of my arrival. Although Sub School and quals included an essential understanding of each important system, in those days hardly anything was discussed at my level about the overall FBM development process. The author offers a spinning coin having on one side the political matters and on the other side some moderate-depth technical details.
While explaining the FBM programme in the first eight fascinating chapters, complete with British spellings, the author sets the stage for his ninth chapter thesis in two particular areas. One is to point out (at every opportunity) mission conflicts, not the least of which is perceived competition with the Air Force's land- and airplane-based weapons. The Special Projects Office successfully deflected that one early on by giving its FBM fleet what was to be perceived as a "different" mission. My boat's stated mission was very specific: deterrence through assured retaliatory destruction. The first-generation Polaris boats assured destruction of enemy cities by a general blanket of bombs having only modest accuracy. Over the years, the author points out, various interests sought to increase payloads, range and/or accuracy. These included military leaders from the Navy and other services; Defense Department and other civilian leaders; and Presidents. However, too large a leap in accuracy would lead to the emergence of a "hard target," pre-emptive strike capability, which some factions sought and others resisted because of its potentially destabilizing impact. Second, he explains the long term position taken by the Special Projects Office in persistently refusing to commit to potentially unachievable results. The SPO instead converted those parameters to reasonable "goals" to keep the FBM program on track and consistently "successful."
On the technical front, the overall FBM development plan had to meet challenges in a broad range of disciplines. The subs themselves are nearly taken for granted and discussed very generically except where the discussion ties in directly to a weapon system development. The nuclear power plants are only lightly touched upon, and then, principally to explain how Admiral Rickover's influence over the program was minimized to the extent possible. Most "auxiliary" and electrical systems are not discussed at all. But many worthwhile discussions include the search for reliable and secure navigation systems; position-keeping with SINS; satellite support and vulnerabilities; radio communications; fire control; guidance systems; computers (or rather, meeting goals in spite of a lack of computer power); launch tube structure and development; the rockets themselves; their fuels, control mechanisms and safety problems; re-entry vehicles; their evolving payloads; MRV and MIRV deployment; and the quest for increasing range and accuracy. Some of these systems I haven't seen in print since I turned in my piping manual. The impacts of some scientific and geologic discoveries are explained including the non-spherical shape of the earth and the influence of gravitational variations on gyro-stabilized platforms for both navigation and guidance. Some of the aspects I found most interesting were the payload configurations including re-entry vehicles; bomb composition and yields; MIRV's and the avoidance of fratricide; effects of EMP; decoy methods; industrial competition in inertial navigation systems, especially in gyroscope development; and a few other unexpected matters having a significant influence on target accuracy. While some of the payload configurations and a few of the numbers don't agree exactly with what I thought we had on board, I found no discrepancies to complain about.
In spite of an occasional redundancy I completely savored the main course - the first eight chapters. The ninth chapter, entitled "Understanding Technical Change in Weaponry," opens in a different mood, apparently intending to be a discussion over dessert. It's nearly free standing, written in a much more difficult style and fraught with complex sentences. I toughed that one out anyway so as not to risk missing any tasty tidbits that could have been embedded.
The extensive footnotes contain many interesting comments and point to numerous resources including interviews, although I fear some references might be beyond practical access for further study.
"From Polaris to Trident..." is a very worthwhile read especially if you're interested in the subsystems mentioned above. I particularly recommend it to new active duty submariners because it contains information I now wish I knew when I was there. It could spark an interest in a particular rating.


Click Here to see more reviews about: From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Get 8% OFF

Click here for more information about From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Read More...

Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy Review

Average Reviews:

(More customer reviews)China's maritime capacity, two associate professors of strategy at the US Naval War College argue in an important new work, is close to reaching a point where its theories will be put into practice. What this commanding of the seas "with Chinese characteristics" will look like, and what it will imply for regional stability and the ability of the US to remain involved in the region, is the focus of Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes' Red Star Over the Pacific.
While there is no dearth of studies on the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), efforts to understand it have for the most part been limited to the Order of Battle -- that is, tallying up what China currently deploys, plans to deploy and is developing. Much less effort, however, has been put into understanding China's maritime doctrine, and this is where Yoshihara and Holmes' book, which assesses a variety of Chinese-language sources and pronouncements on the subject, provides helpful illumination.
As "Western apathy toward traditional sea power" manifests itself, the authors write, "Asians bolt together fleets with gusto." Spearheading this effort is China, which has already built power-projection capabilities for what they call a "post-Taiwan" environment. Whether this rise will be benign and focused on non-traditional challenges (such as anti-piracy and protecting sea lanes) rather than "pounding away at enemy fleets" is something that can, if only imperfectly, be extracted from trends in Chinese defense circles.
Although the authors do not predict a cataclysmic clash of navies as seen during World War II between the US and Japan, they nevertheless argue that the "material ingredients for competition and rivalry are certainly present in the tight confines of the East Asian littoral."
In such a rapidly evolving environment, what Chinese naval experts are reading, saying and writing can provide important clues. And what many Chinese are reading, the authors tell us, is Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 19th century US Navy flag officer and military historian whose concept of sea power had an enormous influence on navies around the world. If Chinese strategists are selective in their usage of Mahan's theories and accept its martial themes uncritically, it is possible Beijing will follow along the lines of Germany and Japan to sea power, which in the authors' view would imply dim prospects for the region.
While the Chinese defense community is not monolithic, some Chinese analysts have tended to "gravitate toward the more memorable passages of Mahan's works for their own narrow purposes, ratifying predetermined conclusions" with Mahan furnishing the "geopolitical logic for an offensive Chinese naval strategy" and Mao Zedong thought providing the tactics to execute that strategy.
In some quarters, Chinese theorists have argued that China should achieve a national resurgence from "continental civilization" -- Mao's inward-looking strategy -- to "maritime civilization" and have made the case for national greatness as an inextricable component of sea power, a position that Yoshihara and Holmes see as "unmistakably Mahanian."
Based on their reading of the Chinese debate and signaling on its maritime strategy, the authors conclude that China's march to the sea and efforts to deny access to others will not end with Taiwan (though securing it would provide substantial advantages in power projection within and beyond the first island chain). China, they argue, will "strive to achieve and ensure access for itself -- and amass the capacity to deny access to others -- in concentric geographic rings ripping out from the Chinese coastline."
As it built its capabilities, the authors argue that Beijing carefully managed its maritime rise "to avoid setting in motion a cycle of naval challenges and response like the one that drove Anglo-German enmity," and therefore have so far succeeded where Germany failed. A factor that has helped China assuage fears of its naval rise, they write, is that unlike the German case, the Chinese naval threat remains largely distant and abstract to its potential targets, especially in the case of US policymakers and taxpayers. Given its geographical proximity to the UK, Germany had no such room to maneuver and an alarmed London mobilized accordingly to keep the scorpion in the bottle.
Despite cutbacks and other priorities, there is no doubt that the US remains a major actor and guarantor of security in Asia. As the Chinese navy expands its area of operation -- and barring a US pullout from the region -- the potential for friction between the two navies will increase. To Chinese eyes, the uncontested US presence in the East Asian seas is akin to the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) strategy of "encirclement and suppression" during the Chinese Civil War, the authors write, adding that the response to this encirclement is likely to be similar to that adopted by Mao, which is to elongate the war and tire out the enemy. Chinese naval strategists also often talk about prying the control of the waters west of the first island chain from the US Navy.
Employing its deep continental interior, China's strategy aims to use of bases from which to strike targets in littoral sea areas, the authors say. As the range of its weapons increases, the PLA can employ its strategic depth to "draw enemies deep into Chinese territory before striking a devastating counterblow," a strategy that, as the authors point out, would have found favor with Mao. Given this strategy and the continental pull that continues to animate PLA strategy, it is likely the Chinese will prefer to keep the PLAN close to home, and there are questions whether it would feel confident dispatching fleets for independent operations beyond shore-based cover. Which platforms China deploys in the coming years should serve as an indicator of its preferred strategy, though according to the authors we can expect a mix of both.
The central section of the book -- "Fleet Tactics with Chinese Characteristics," "Missile and Antimissile Interaction at Sea" and "China's Emerging Undersea Nuclear Deterrent" -- touches on more technical aspects of naval warfare, but does so with commendable clarity and in a way that will prove appealing, even to readers who are not military experts. One conclusion that can be reached from this section is that the US ships equipped with the Aegis radar and missile system would be a priority target.
This discussion is followed by a section on China's "soft power" at sea, mostly through the use of the Chinese mariner Zheng He narrative, which dovetails with Beijing's continued efforts to portray its rise in peaceful, and therefore non-threatening, terms. The book concludes with a discussion of the future of US naval strategy in Asia.
Cautionary though never alarmist, Red Star over the Pacific is a superb addition to the growing body of literature on Chinese military power and strategy. Future architects of naval strategy for the region should study the prescriptions contained in this volume with great care to ensure that China's march to the sea is addressed with both the firmness and balance that is required.
(Originally published in the Taipei Times, Jan. 30, 2011, p. 14.)

Click Here to see more reviews about: Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy

Get 34% OFF

Click here for more information about Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy

Read More...

Trailblazer: The U.S. Navy's First Black Admiral Review

Average Reviews:

(More customer reviews)"Trailblazer, The U.S. Navy's First Black Admiral", is a tour de force first-person account of the life of Samuel L. Gravely, Jr. In his youth, he learned well the lessons of Jim Crow in his home-town of Richmond, Virginia. In spite of the various obstacles placed in his path by a narrow-minded society, he went on to become one of the first African Americans to be commissioned as an officer and, ultimately, as the very first African American officer to attain flag rank in the U.S. Navy.
Admiral Gravely tells his story with the help of Paul Stillwell, who is a Navy veteran, editor and author of "The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Black Naval Officers." In the Trailblazer book, we see through Admiral Gravely's eyes and in his voice how he climbed the ladder in the Navy to become the first African American to command a ship, the first to command a fleet, and the first to become an admiral in 1971. His ground-breaking achievements were a tribute to his deeply ingrained strength of character, fiercely dedicated temperament, and dogged perseverance.
Trailblazer also details the personal legacy of Admiral Gravely, the husband and family man, as seen through the eyes of his devoted and loving wife, Alma, including their whirlwind courtship, which lead to their marriage in 1946 - a rich and full union that lasted 58 years - to the death of their beloved older son Robbie in 1978, and finally to Alma's making peace with the certainty of his impending death.
"Sammie," as Alma affectionately referred to the Admiral, very wisely drew from a diverse pool of experiences, as well as from leadership examples provided by his fellow officers, in modeling his own command style during his impressive naval service career. He became THE role model to emulate and set a fine example for thousands of African American naval officers who came after him.
Admiral Gravely poignantly describes one of the more distasteful aspects that made an excruciatingly painful and enduring impression on him during his first duty posting, after his graduation from midshipman school in December 1941. He had returned to Camp Robert Smalls, where he had started his naval service two years earlier, only to find that he was still living in a very clearly segregated world. The naval training station at Great Lakes had quarters for white officers, but not for him. The officer's club was open to white officers, but not to him. To add insult to injury, after he pulled daily watches encompassing the whole camp, he had to return to the distinctly separate "Black camp" each night to sleep. Gravely, regarding this blatant disparity in the service ranks (and society as a whole) as a formidable obstacle, noted, "This was one of the hardest things for me to take of anything that happened to me during my Navy career."
Admiral Gravely always relished and welcomed any and every opportunity for additional training, personal enrichment, and overall challenge of being a part of something new. Continuous educational growth formed the bulwark of his life's mantra. He never knew what he would encounter in the next stage of his life, but he knew for certain what he was leaving behind.
He just wanted to be "a regular sailor."
Samuel L. Gravely was "a regular sailor" ... and then some! As Rear Admiral Barry C. Black, USN (Ret.) said in his advanced praise of the book, "Vice Admiral Samuel L. Gravely, Jr. blazed a trail of courage, hospitality, humility, excellence, faithfulness, and patriotism. His pioneering accomplishments opened doors of opportunity for thousands, enabling me to become the Chief of Navy Chaplains and the 62nd Chaplain of the Unites States Senate. I stand on his strong shoulders."
Trailblazer is an inspiring story about an exceptionally unique barrier-breaking and visionary gentleman, Vice Admiral Samuel L. Gravely, Jr., USN. It is a very humbling regular sailor's account of triumph and growth in the face of adversity and of his awe inspiring legacy to our Nation and our U.S. Navy.
One certainly need not be a fan or student of the military realm to appreciate the dedication and drive of this remarkable man, who overcame, with great courage, grace, and poise, every challenge he faced as the Trailblazer.


Click Here to see more reviews about: Trailblazer: The U.S. Navy's First Black Admiral

Get 24% OFF

Click here for more information about Trailblazer: The U.S. Navy's First Black Admiral

Read More...