Seapower As Strategy: Navies and National Interests Review

Average Reviews:

(More customer reviews)The author is the leading light in naval writing. He lives up to every expectation in this book, which uses brilliant historical and technological analysis to explain the nature of naval strategy and the utility of navies.
'The key, and the theme of this book, is a very old idea,' Friedman writes. 'About four centuries ago, Francis Bacon wrote that "he that commandeth the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will."'
With his customary clarity Friedman describes the relationship between naval powers and land powers, the naval strategies of the world wars and the Cold War, the impact of technology, and current US naval strategy. Like many naval theorists, he relies heavily on discerning lessons from British experience. He applies those lessons to the United States' situation.
No naval enthusiasts will regret reading this book; it will at least clarify their thoughts. Students of geopolitical history are very likely to find it useful, too.
And the Naval Institute Press, as usual, has turned out a handsome volume: you can see your money in the excellent editing, printing and binding. I have no connection with the publisher.

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A noted defense analyst and naval weapons expert lays out the roles of navies and naval strategy in the twenty-first century. Drawing upon historical examples, Norman Friedman first explains how and why naval strategy differs from other kinds of military strategy and then provides a sense of the special flavor of a maritime or naval approach to national security problems. The various uses of navies are described and illustrated by extended case studies covering the last quarter-millennium. Friedman presents these observations in the context of U.S. post-Cold War security concerns and concepts. He explains how and why the United States currently espouses a maritime strategy and argues that navies are likely to regain a dominant position due to changes both in their own technology and in air and ground forces. He urges countries with the appropriate geographical and economic advantages, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, to use their inherent maritime leverage. Rare among books on naval strategy, this work combines an examination of the vital role of coalition partners, especially those with significant ground forces, with a comprehensive survey of relevant technology and the way that strategy can be reflected in the design of an evolving fleet. The author is known for his ability to explain modern technology to lay audiences, and his book is suitable for all those interested in public policy questions as well as national security professionals and students of strategy. The book's publication at a time of potential change in U.S. national strategy only reinforces its value as a document worthy of study.