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(More customer reviews)Amateur British historian Geoff Hewitt was concerned that traditional histories of the Battle of Britain and Operation Sealion - the German plan to invade England in 1940 - appear to give all credit for the British victory to the Royal Air Force, while ignoring the Royal Navy's role. Hewitt argues - with good justification - that whether or not the RAF could Luftwaffe in the skies over southern England was less significant to the prospects of a successful German invasion than the Royal Navy's undisputed control over the English Channel. The author develops two hypotheses: first, that the Royal Navy was the primary reason that the Germans did not invade and second, that if the Germans had been foolish enough to try, that the Royal Navy would have smashed the attempt in mid-channel. The author makes his case in three main sections, the first dealing with a discussion of German invasion capabilities, the second with the Royal Navy's capabilities and the third with the record of air-sea actions in Norway and off Dunkirk as a determinant of how Sealion might have played out. Overall, this book is fairly well argued and an interesting read, although it displays a bit too much British parochialism at times and the level of analysis presented to `prove' his hypotheses is not particularly balanced.
When it comes to the subject of Sealion, most authors decide a priori either for or against. This book is solidly in the "it could never have worked category," which is okay but not particularly imaginative. The opening short chapters cover the status of the Kriegsmarine surface fleet in the summer of 1940 (weak), followed by the evolution of the Sealion plan in July-September 1940 and the capabilities of the Germans to defend a crossing with mines, coastal batteries and U-Boats. German airborne capabilities are minimized and aerial resupply is ignored. The final chapters try to put it all together to assess Sealion's probability of success - as well as attempting to deflate the legend of the Battle of Britain - but the effort is only a partial success at best.
The author does present some very good points, that the Luftwaffe had a hard time sinking moving warships at sea, that neither mines nor coastal guns could effectively prevent the Royal Navy from operating in the English Channel and that ultimately, sea control was accomplished by naval forces, not airpower. I think the author also makes a good argument that traditional historiography of this period has tended to portray "the few" of the RAF as the sole defenders of Great Britain, while ignoring the Royal Navy. Readers will have little doubt after reading Hitler's Armada that the existence of the Royal Navy was a major reason why Sealion was cancelled.
However, the author's efforts to prove that the Luftwaffe could not have inflicted severe enough losses on the Royal Navy in the Channel to enable Sealion are undermined by the lack of real analysis or quantitative assessment. For example, he points out that although the Luftwaffe sank a significant number of Royal Navy warships off Dunkirk and Norway, that the navy still accomplished its mission and that these conditions (e.g. warships stationary in harbor vs. maneuvering at sea) were more favorable than they would have been in the Channel. However, in both these cases, weather and distance to target also negatively affected Luftwaffe performance more than they would have over the Channel in September 1940. Unfortunately, the author devotes much less space to Royal Navy operations off Crete, pointing out that the British intercepted a German convoy and succeeded in evacuating British troops, despite significant losses. In fact, the British intercept of the German convoy on 21 May 1941 was much less successful than portrayed here; only 297 German troops out of 2,300 were lost. He does not mention that British efforts to intercept a second convoy on 22 May were driven off by Luftwaffe bombers. Later, the Germans succeeded in getting both tanks and artillery to Crete. Furthermore, the Germans succeeded in sinking or damaging 26 of the 45 Royal Navy warships operating around Crete, indicating that the Luftwaffe could inflict crippling losses on the Royal Navy.
This author also fails to address the subjective factors that greatly influenced the first years of the Second World War. For example, the British made a great many avoidable mistakes in 1939-42 and the author's assumption that they would detect an invasion quickly and act accordingly are very contentious. In February 1942, the Germans sailed a major battle fleet through the English Channel for 12 hours before they were detected! In 1941-42, the British missed convoy after convoy going to North Africa, including two complete panzer divisions. Thus, the author should have addressed the possibility of the Germans achieving some kind of tactical surprise. Second, he ignores the fact that time and again, the Germans got lucky breaks - often due to risk-taking that no one anticipated - that led to success.
The final chapter deals with the author's conjecture that if the Germans had attempted Sealion, that it would have been blasted to pieces in mid-channel by the Royal Navy and even if a few troops had been landed, the British Army could have handled them. I found this scenario to be premised on the notion of a non-thinking opponent who would obligingly parade his entire invasion flotilla past British destroyers for target practice. Based upon how the Germans modified Fall Gelb and how they adapted to battlefield realities in Greece, North Africa and Russia, I doubt they would have been so dumb. The Sealion plan presented here is the one the British knew that they could defeat, but had it actually occurred - no plan survives first contact with the enemy - the Germans would have almost certainly modified it to get some force ashore and then work on a battle of attrition in the channel, which the Royal Navy could not sustain indefinitely.
Click Here to see more reviews about: HITLER'S ARMADA: The Royal Navy and the Defence of Great Britain April - October 1940
Hitler's Armada examines the aborted German invasion of 1940 in a fresh and original manner by looking past the myths and legends which have subsequently surrounded it, in order to arrive at significant new conclusions by referring back to the actual events.
The book presents fascinating detail of Hitler's Operation SEALION and, by study of its weaknesses, demonstrates that control of the sea, not the air, was the critical factor.It also questions whether the traditional British view of the importance of the Battle of Britain as the key factor in the prevention of invasion is really tenable.
The importance of the Royal Navy during this period, generally overlooked, is brought into sharp focus and, possibly for the first time, the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy anti-invasion forces are presented in detail.The author examines the relative strengths of the two sides drawing interesting conclusions about the inadequacies of the German resources particularly and their reliance on mine laying.
The author discusses the conflict between air and sea power in the months leading up to the summer of 1940, concluding that, at this stage of the Second World war, air power was far from supreme.
The findings of the author may be controversial, but the process by which they are reached strongly supports their validity.
REVIEWS
"Any historian or general lover of history in Hitler, or the importance of the Germany Navy in WWII, will find this book immensely informative, yet still simple and understandable." Nautical Research Journal, 03/2010
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