Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)I have mixed views on this book and first discuss the good. The information that is provided in the book is generally new and not covered in other sources. It deals primarily with the construction of the Monitor, Passaic class ironclads, Canonicus (called Tippecanoe class in the book) class ironclads, and Casco class ironclads. Provided is information on the how the designs were created, contracts allocated, project management, cost overuns, design changes, postponements, and resulting lawsuits. Also provided is the information on the interactions and activities of the main people involved in the process such as Ericsson, Welles, Stilmer, Fox, etc. and the contractors that built the ships. The book does not cover operational details of the ships.
Now the bad. Much of the book discusses the many postponements and cost overuns that resulted due to the design changes to the Canonicus and Casco class monitors. However, the actual problems and fixes are barely mentioned. A bit more technical information should have been provided because it would assisted the reader in understanding the reasons for the changes and the time required to make them. A more major problem is that the book provides just brief mention of the design and constuction of all the other non-monitor types, which constituted about half of the ironclads in the U.S. Navy. Missing is all but the briefest mention of the New Ironsides, Keokuk, Galena, Roanoke, two-gun monitors, and the various assortment of non-monitor river ironclads.
The book is titled "Civil War Ironclads." A much smaller subtitle that is on the cover but not bookend is "The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobiliation." As discussed above, the focus of the book is more narrow than this. The title should have been: "Civil War Monitors"
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Civil War Ironclads supplies the first comprehensive study of one of the most ambitious programs in the history of naval shipbuilding. In constructing its new fleet of ironclads, William H. Roberts explains, the U.S. Navy faced the enormous engineering challenges of a largely experimental technology. In addition, it had to manage a ship acquisition program of unprecedented size and complexity. To meet these challenges, the Navy established a "project office" that was virtually independent of the existing administrative system. The office spearheaded efforts to broaden the naval industrial base and develop a marine fleet of ironclads by granting shipbuilding contracts to inland firms. Under the intense pressure of a wartime economy, it learned to support its high-technology vessels while incorporating the lessons of combat.But neither the broadened industrial base nor the advanced management system survived the return of peace. Cost overruns, delays, and technical blunders discredited the embryonic project office, while capital starvation and never-ending design changes crippled or ruined almost every major builder of ironclads. When Navy contracts evaporated, so did the shipyards. Contrary to widespread belief, Roberts concludes, the ironclad program set Navy shipbuilding back a generation.
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