Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture Review

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(More customer reviews)I opened Mr. Thompson's book with great anticipation. I finished it with equally great disappointment. Considering Mr. Thompson's credentials, I have expected a constructive review and critique of failures of thought, philosophy, and attitudes affecting USN. I looked forward to a dispassionate and objective analysis of problems frequently discussed on the pages of the "Proceedings," but in a broader context, founded on open- mindedness and objectivity. Instead, I learned a lot about naval and aerial excellence of Canada. The inevitable conclusion I derived from the book was the need for USN to moor its ships as rapidly as possible, and embark upon "introspective fleet-wide stand down" of indefinite duration.
The need for a thorough study of problems affecting USN is preeminent. Mr. Thompson's execution of the concept falls short of the intent. Probably the greatest deficiency is the fact that much of the information contained is based on secondary or even tertiary sources, and evident lack of objectivity. An inexperienced, sensation-hungry reader will accept all statements as facts, even if the latter are too often tinted by journalistic eagerness to "get a good story" or the wish to prove superiority of the home team.
The tendency to praise one's own achievements at any cost is not the exclusive attribute of USN, and PAOs of any navy will make certain that a tug accidentally swamped by the wake of a destroyer steaming at 35 knots during a hectic free-play exercise will be converted into "significant damage to the OPFOR surface asset." The need, whether real or perceived, to convert embarrassment into some measure of success is fairly universal in all organizations tasked with public reporting of their affairs. Unsurprisingly, the art of "positive spin" is vigorously taught at all university-level crisis management courses. Harmful? Yes. Frequent? Very. Globally distributed? Indeed.
The dismissive or even scornful evaluation of USN efforts by foreign officers quoted in the book as the supporting evidence is often nothing but the reverse of the same sentiment exhibited by USN personnel when unofficially commenting on non-US services. With the professional rivalry among all navies, admission of excellence in others is probably the most difficult to get, and when forthcoming, it has a very grudging form. Thus, in the absence of specific evidence, post-exercise debriefing data and conclusions, raw personal comments devoid of quantitative scrutiny are largely insignificant in an analytical study. Mr. Thompson admits that such data are virtually unobtainable. Unfortunately, he fails to qualify his findings by clearly indicating that personal comments may not reflect the true reality, and constitute nothing but the reflection of subjective thought. Combined with the author's consistent and uncritical touting of the Canadian excellence, one's doubts about the factual nature of his reservations concerning USN are amplified. Both Royal and Canadian navies had enough troubles of their own to provide material for companion volumes to the "Lessons Not Learned." Some of these troubles were, indeed, quite spectacular.

Most of the book is devoted to the criticism of large aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines as useful fleet assets. Nobody, not even their staunchest supporters, offered serious professional arguments that CVNs and SSNs are invincible platforms. To the contrary, concerns about their vulnerability and operational usefulness in the context of current realities have been frequently raised, and debates on the pages of the Proceedings prove the fact. Equally, USN recognizes the threat posed by modern SSKs operating in either littoral or open waters. Mr. Thompson does not introduce a new arguments. The fact that the navy "acquired" a Swedish Gotland class vessel in order to develop and practice appropriate ASW measures proves that, institutionally, USN is keenly aware of the need to develop measures limiting SSK-posed threats. One may also add (Mr. Thompson failed to mention the fact) that RN's elimination of conventional submarines from its list of its commissioned vessels represent a clear step backward. The author's objectivity is shaken even further by the omission of the fact that, following the sale of the Upholders to Canada, the Royal Navy is now dependent on foreign SSKs to maintain its full range of ASW capabilities. Thus, while USN made a sensible decision, the pansy-footing of the British politicians led to a colossal blunder whose impact upon ASW readiness of RN remains yet to be seen.
The events in Persian Gulf provided USN with a sharp lesson on the importance of MCM, and corrective measures are introduced even if slowly. New MCM vessels are joining the fleet, training is intensified, and the threat by the wide range of mines is clearly recognized. Surely, the level of arrogance and hubris characterizing USN are far less intense than postulated by Mr. Thompson. Unfortunately, after reading "Lessons Not Learned" a non-professional reader will derive entirely opposite conclusion.
The book has a major potential to be used as a "factual resource" in public debates concerning the future of the Navy. Herein lies another danger: rather than promoting a healthy review (author's stated intention), Mr. Thompson may have done a significant disservice to the organization that has better things to do than rebutting ill-informed and poorly reasoned criticisms leveled by often amateurish journalists and populist politicians basing their opinions on "Lessons Not Learned." Unfortunately, Mr. Thompson fails to observe that USN is indisputably a "learning organization:" it keenly observes the achievements of other navies, their level of training and excellence, and extracts/adapts many of their best practices. Like all giants, it may often learn embarrassingly slowly, and the process could be improved. But learn it does, and quite effectively at that.
There is hardly any doubt that USN has many problems related to personnel issues. Very frequent subject of recent contributions to the Proceedings, this critical aspect is (surprisingly) the subject of only two chapters in the book. If the intentions of Mr. Thompson to provide a measure of constructive criticism were to be fulfilled, his main thrust should be applied here rather than to a extolling the excellence of Canada.
Threat-laden and bordering on the absurd promotion philosophies, personnel policies that do not effectively support professional development, "monorail" training, extreme administrative loads imposed upon personnel afloat, rapid rotation, etc., prevent concentration on issues as fundamental as ship handling, damage control, and war fighting. Obesity is, frankly, an irrelevant issue in this context.
The modern USN might have fallen the victim of policies summarized by the famous signal sent by Admiral Sir Percy Scott, RN to HMS Roxbourgh "Since paintwork seems to be more in demand than gunnery you had better come in and make yourself pretty." The recent article in the US Naval Institute "Proceedings" that documents potential need to have civilian shiphandler contractors amplifies this impression to a hair-rising level. It is a sign of most embarrassing times when many a surface warfare officer is incapable of getting underway or placing the ship alongside without tug assistance. Still, shiphandling is not much of an element in an officer's evaluation, and, in the atmosphere where a dent in the bow will require hundreds of pages of reporting at best, and a complete ruin of one's career at worst, it is not surprising that all "play safe," and concentrate on more "career promoting" endeavours. In fact, today's USN would not allow another Nimitz to emerge: grounding one's ship was a "capital offence" even in his days. Today a lesser incident would ruin the future of a junior lieutenant. A Nelson among the ranks of modern USN is equally unthinkable. He'd be dismissed as a "dangerous and insubordinate maverick."
There is no doubt that many senior and flag officers shudder at the thought of nonconformity and criticism: the invariably tight "mind control" exercised by PAOs in all interactions between USN personnel and the outside world proves the point. Too often constructive criticism offered by junior officers is not only unwelcome, but will result in a long-lasting, career-damaging leads "blot in one's copybook." The institutional fear of criticism is but an exponent of poor leadership whose consequence is the substitution of unflattering realities with slogans, meaningless verbiage, and political correctness. Too often the wardroom forgets that words hardly ever impressed the lower deck. Personal integrity, professional competence and knowledge, and even-handed, fairly applied discipline always produced wonders.

The demonstrable deficiencies in the arena of leadership lead to cynicism, indifference, and even "mental paralysis" whose ultimately outcome is careerism, "ticket punching," and the accompanying development of new layers within the already massive bureaucracy whose members shudder each time they hear the word "ship." The notion of USN's own version of Parkinson's Law alive and operating at full throttle is quite inescapable. Far worse is the fact that, while leadership failures are evident at all strata of the navy, the problem is probably most acute at the officer intake level: the Academy. Honour code notwithstanding, incidents of dishonourable conduct emerge with a fairly high frequency, and underscore inadequacy of the current leadership training. For reasons that remain utterly inexplicable, the latter is not conducted in the manner reflecting the nature of the service, but rather as a combination of school of business theories on...Read more›

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Despite its reputation as the most impressive naval force in the world, the U.S. Navy is in trouble, according to the author of this book, and systemic weaknesses could be its undoing. Here, military sociologist Roger Thompson provides a compelling, often scathing, assessment of the U.S. Navy and its learning disabilities and then presents a convincing argument for reform. Thompson points to the U.S. Navy sup or outpromotion system, massive personnel turnover, inexperienced crews, and drug and alcohol abuse as problems that make it difficult for the Navy to build cohesive, well-trained fighting units. In a review of the Navy s recent history, he finds that its ships, submarines, and aircraft are often outperformed in competitions and exercises with other navies and its failures are either denied altogether or perfunctorily excused. Diesel submarines so quiet that they are rarely detected until it s too late to prevent an attack routinely surpass expensive U.S. nuclear subs and put U.S. aircraft carriers in danger. American naval pilots, whose weapons are often improperly tested, are frequently bested by military pilots from other countries. Because the U.S. Navy doesn t have enough surface ships to protect its capital ships, American carrier strike groups now use Canadian ships as escorts. Shortcomings like these, Thompson argues, undermine the Navy s potential and should be cause for national concern.
In presenting a side of the U.S. Navy that s rarely discussed, this book spells out lessons the Navy must learn if it is going to succeed in an era of asymmetrical warfare of David-versus-Goliath conflicts. In his conclusion, the author puts forth a twelve-step program that calls on the U.S. Navy to rethink its naval strategy, to lose some weight, and to focus on the fundamentals.

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