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(More customer reviews)This book describes the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy as seen from a postwar Japanese perspective, and as written for a Japanese audience. Masanori Ito was a journalist in Tokyo during the Pacific conflict, personally knew many of the Imperial Navy's principal wartime commanders, and was able to interview them both during and after the war. Ito's access to and relationships with these men allowed him to provide unique insights into Japanese policy making and planning prior to, during, and after the conflict, and helps to explain chosen Japanese courses of action. Consistent with Japan's postwar relationship with its historical role in the Second World War, however, Ito is selective about those aspects of Japanese military and naval activity he chooses to discuss, is uncritical of Japanese motives, and omits important facts that reflect poorly on Japanese wartime conduct. This selectivity considerably diminishes what would otherwise have been a valuable English-language translation of Japanese views.
Ito sets the stage by discussing the place of the IJN in modern Japanese history and by explaining his reasons for writing the book, principally in response to postwar Japanese public curiosity about the truth of what transpired during the war and such questions as why Japan was able to build some of the largest warships in the world only to see them destroyed without playing roles commensurate with their size. He also quickly surveys prewar Army and Navy political positions and mindsets, a discussion that reflects well on the Navy and sets the tone for subsequent consideration of wartime strategic decisions. From there the book is organized chronologically, proceeding more or less through the major Pacific battles chapter by chapter until Leyte, to which Ito devotes three chapters. The last Leyte chapter includes a fascinating postwar interview with Vice Admiral Kurita, the Japanese Center Force commander. The book's concluding chapters cover the "special attack" (Kamikaze) operations, and return to the political discussion. Two appendices detail the fate of major Japanese warships and a chronology of wartime ship production and losses.
As a work of history, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy is ultimately unsatisfying because of the selectivity mentioned above. From a western perspective there is an evasive incompleteness to the narrative, and it is hard to ignore what is a transparent effort to present Japan's wartime history in the best possible light. For example, Ito describes the Imperial Army's goal in the various occupied areas following the early victories in 1942 as "winning the cooperation of the populace" (p. 71). Anyone familiar with these campaigns would find such a description dishonest, at least. Ito faults the IJN for failing to stop the Imperial Army from hastening the nation toward war, and focuses on the folly of fighting both the U.S. and U.K simultaneously. In Ito's view, however--and apparently that of the IJN at the time--the war was a bad idea not because it was wrong to invade and subjugate neighboring countries but rather because Japan was unlikely to win.
The list of translated Japanese works on the Pacific War is not long, and The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy is worth reading by virtue of being on that list. What Ito presents in a straightforward manner is informative, and much is also revealed by how he chooses to address more controversial subjects. For those interested in detailed accounts of the Japanese navy's development, the Pacific War's battles, and Japanese politics preceding the war there are better books written by western authors. For those interested in Japanese accounts, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy paints a rosy but incomplete picture.
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