Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)It says a lot when a book is touted as being written by a so-called expert and then no less than the front cover photo is printed backwards! If you don't even know one side of an F-16CJ from another, then, frankly, you probably have no business publishing a book on modern airpower. On the very first page of the preface, the author cites the German WW II Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter by making the oft-repeated and amateurish mistake of using the improper Me 109 designation in its place. He then proceeds to describe the B-24 heavy bomber as a "medium" bomber. Designations for the F4U Corsair and F6F Hellcat fighters are also listed inaccurately as F-4U and F-6F, showing that the author doesn't even know how to properly designate the aircraft he professes to be an expert about. Keep in mind, all of the above is found in just the front cover and preface!
Within the body of the main text, twin 23mm cannons on the MiG-15 are listed as non-existent 21mm guns. In the sixth page of the photo pages, Boeing C/KC-97 aircraft are clearly shown with post-1947 US markings, but the reader is told that the image illustrates aircraft production during its peak in 1944. One of the aircraft depicted therein is a KC-97 air-to-air refueling variant that wasn't even built until 1950. On the 8th page of photos, another photo caption makes the ridiculous statement that "Naval airpower was used in Korea, but without much effect." Read the article entitled "Naval Air War: Over Third of US Combat Air Strikes In Korea By Navy," printed in Naval Aviation News of DEC 52, and see if the book photo caption still makes any sense at all.
On page 263, the author contradicts that same photo caption about naval airpower in Korea and finally gives a more rational assessment of naval airpower in Korea, but the author once again confuses things by stating the following: "With some exceptions, there was little in these missions that could not have been carried out, and was not carried out, by air force aircraft based either in Japan or in South Korea itself."
There is no clear timeline for the above reference but the author he fails to make clear that, during the very earliest and opening phase of the war, USAF F-80 jets did not have the range necessary to reach Korea with any meaningful ordnance load. In fact, at the time war broke out, in June 1950, Far East Air Force (FEAF) F-80s did not even have bomb racks available to them in Japan. This means that not only did they lack long-range fuel tanks, but they had no way to carry underwing ordnance such as bombs and rockets, even if the increased fuel had allowed them the range. Up to that time, the primary mission of the F-80a had been air-to-air defense against Soviet nuclear-armed bombers from threatening Japan.
Without the speed and flexibility demonstrated by naval airpower in those first few months, the Pusan Perimeter would certainly have collapsed and, later, Marines engaged at the Chosin Reservoir would almost certainly have been annihilated without the cover of Marine close air support. The F-80s could not land on rough airstrips in Korea due to the risks of suffering foreign object damage (FOD) due to their low-slung jet intakes and the vulnerability of their delicate jet engine.
F-80 pilots were forced to temporarily switch back to propeller-driven F-51s,in order to launch any meaningful close air support missions for US troops on the ground Korea. The USAF, which had recently become a virtually all-jet force, could not handle the rough conditions of primitive or damaged Korean airfield as the more robust piston-engined aircraft could, including several Navy and Marine types that also had the advantage of close proximity to the battlefield due to their aircraft carriers. To dismiss the importance and significance of Navy and Marine airpower in the Korean War is to fundamentally misunderstand the very basic nature of that conflict.
On page 263, there is a reference to Navy fighters escorting B-29s, allegedly because their "land-based opposite numbers were too fast." Too fast??? No, the real reason why the Marine Corps Douglas F3D Skyknight night-fighter was used to escort USAF B-29 bombers was due, specifically, to its radar-guided night-fighting capability. B-29s, which had continued to suffer increasing losses to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft fire shifted to night-time raids, in order to better evade the enemy fighters and AAA. Once again, there seems to be a complete failure to understand the tactics employed in this war and their reason for being.
The author also tells us that the Russian-built MiG-15s did not come equipped with an ejection seat. Where does pure nonsense like that come from? The North Koreans did not wear hard flight helmets and they did not have the benefit of G-suits, but the MiG-15 most certainly WAS equipped with an ejection seat. If the author wishes to make claims like this, it would at least be nice to have some source documentation to back up the assertions.
I only wasted 20 pages worth of my time on this book and skimmed through a few more spot checks before I realized it was a lost cause. I found far too much that is wrong for even a novice history writer, much less somebody whose alleged expertise is repeatedly advertised in the back-cover blurbs and dustjacket flaps. We are given multiple statements about the author's alleged expertise yet, sadly, absolutely no evidence of any expertise about airpower or even general military history makes itself evident within the product. Just saying that somebody is an expert does not mean it is so or that they won't simply rest on their alleged laurels and waste our time and money, as appears to be the case here.
Even "experts" should get their basic facts straight! Those who can't do so shouldn't benefit from producing something this bad. As for caption errors and cover-photo blunders, the same, tired old excuses like "the editor did it" don't work. If an author does not oversee and double-check the final product, and allows no less than the COVER photo to be presented backwards, I can offer no sympathy for them when such errors erode overall credibility. That is especially true when I almost immediately find enough within the text to confirm that the overall product is extremely deficient. I'm tired of paying for this kind of junk. If I had paid for my copy, I would have returned it for a refund.
Editors and publishers need to learn that you can no longer get away with this kind of junk. It will not be tolerated by an informed reading public and your firm's reputation will suffer accordingly.
Ronald Lewis
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