Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)Pacific Air is a collection of World War II aviation stories from the Pacific, along with some balancing material regarding the design and manufacture of some of the aircraft mentioned in the book. It is in the category of "Popular History," targeted to aviation war buffs who like to read about pilots "yankin' and bankin'" in combat.
In such a book, the author has the responsibility to
1) select representative stories and render them accuratly;
2) write in a fun and engaging manner;
3) provide a well organized presentation;
4) provide accurate background history to place the stories in context;
5) treat the reputations of our veterans with respect.
So, let's grade Sears' work in those categories:
1: some stories are inaccurate and sloppily retold
2: high marks, a well-written book
3: impossible to maintain a coherent thread
4: abysmal
5: he repeats a false story about one of our still-living veterans that is totally inaccurate and shows a shameful lack of research
1: Selecting representative stories and rendering them accurately: Sears introduces stories from a massive number of aviators, mostly culled from other secondary sources. He has original stories from two still-living aviators, but their combat tales are only a fraction of the last 15 pages of the book. As for the recast stories, Sears has done a sloppy job in at least one.
I decided to check on his re-telling of the story of Saburo Sakai's first aerial combat. Sears depicts it as a short battle. Sakai fires one burst, and "in that one prolonged burst, he had expended all his ammunition (57)," entirely different from what is in Sakai's book Samurai, where Sakai depicts an extended engagement with many bursts fired.
With a bit of purple prose, Sears also castigates Sakai's fellow aviators: "They's dangled him as bait only to rescue him from the enemy predator's hungry jaws. It was a cruel initiation rite that easily could have spelled his end" (57). But according to Sakai, "Anticipating that I might fumble with my controls in my first combat - as I did! - the flight leader had assigned one of the veteran pilots to cover my plane from behind" (29-30). Sakai's prescient and considerate leader is transformed by Sears into a nasty prankster.
This also illustrates one of Sear's poorer attributes: he is very willing to re-write history in order to get a more entertaining tale for his readers. We'll see more of that later.
2) write in a fun and engaging manner: that he does. Sears has an excellent writing style, and he brings his topic to life. He has a deft touch in selecting the telling fact or compelling incident that enlives his subject and bring out the color of a colorful group of aviators. Top marks.
But, characteristic of writing for this audience, he often descends into the morass of purple prose, like: "But in this chaotic and darkening day, fate stalked three of the men - theirs was a blood bond deeper than even shared traditions or camaraderie ... in the next months stretching into years ... In the next months stretching into years, it would snuff the lives (to enemy fire, captivity, or torture; to aircraft malfunctions, collisions, and crashes; to darkness, fog or typhoons; to drowning, exposure, starvation, dehydration, hypoxia, hypothermia or vertigo; to hesitation or overconfidence; to uncounted instances of the unknowable) if a third of the men who ventured from aircraft carrier decks over a hostile, pitiless and seemingly boundless Pacific Ocean" (14-15). Sheesh. Well, there is a market for that kind of stuff, and Sears really plays to that market.
3) provide a well organized presentation: well, according to your taste. Sears subdivides his tale in two sections, 20 chapters and about 370 "page breaks" where he changes topics. Most of the book is in short, one-half to one page vignettes, bouncing back and forth between the over 400 people mentioned in the index. The sections are edited like an MTV music video for an attention-deficit disorder audience. I found it impossible to maintain any continuity in the story, as I had to constantly flip back to remember the background for a particular character in his narrative. I don't have a perfect memory. If you don't either, approach the book with care, unless you are just interested in reading the stories uninhibited by context.
4) provide accurate background history to place the stories in context: really, really bad. Sears makes constant errors in fact and in interpretation. A small sampling:
*Germany's blitzkrieg was "unleashed against Northern Europe in August 1939" (80) instead of in September.
*At the beginning of the war, Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations, wanted to advance through the "Solomon Islands, New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago" (112). In truth, King did not support this (partially MacArthur's) route of advance along New Guinea, believing the proper route was via the Central Pacific in accordance with the Navy's long-established Warplan ORANGE.
*The 1942 Lae / Salamaua strikes were "a huge success" (118); in fact they were a severe disappointment, with poor bombing accuracy.
*Relating a carrier battle, Sears writes that aerial torpedo hits at 2:44 PM "sealed Yorktown's fate" although "it would take hours (stretching into days) of indecision and struggle before Yorktown finally sank" (179). The actual time was 4:20 PM. The ship was being salvaged, but was hit the following afternoon by a Japanese submarine, unmentioned by Sears; these follow-on hits sank the ship. The first hits did not "seal her fate."
*Bombs that hit carriers are invariably described as "armor-piercing." The Japanese did not use AP bombs from dive bombers.
*After a Japanese bombardment of Guadalcanal Sears claimed that "Butt plates of fourteen and eighteen-inch rounds lay everywhere" (231). No Japanese ship mounting eighteen-inch guns ever bombarded Guadalcanal.
*Sears claimed that Japanese losses at Guadalcanal of two battleships, one carrier, five cruisers, twelve destroyers, and eight submarines were "equal in scope to the IJN's entire pre-war strength" (257). The IJN's strength on 6 December 1941 was 10 BB, 10 carriers, 38 cruisers, 108 destroyers and 68 submarines. Sears like to exaggerate to make his topic more dramatic.
*He states that 32 Essex class carriers were under construction or on order by August 1942 (263). The actual number was 23. He claimed that the conversion of Cleveland-class cruisers to light carriers was "necessitated by 1942's devastating carrier attrition at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal." Cleveland-class conversions began in January 1942, and six of the nine were on order prior to the Battle of the Coral Sea.
*Sears gives the deck armor of the battleship California as 14 inches, when it was actually 5.5 inches.
*He speaks of executing fighter tactics without "enemy-alerting radio warnings" (70), in spite of the fact that such transmissions could not possibly alert enemy fighters. Japanese Zeros mostly did not carry radios, and those few that carried them did not use them to monitor US transmissions.
The above are just a sampling of the types of errors that pop up with disconcerting frequency.
As one of his themes, Sears propagates the fable that surface officers - the "Gun Club" - saw aviation's value solely as the scouting eyes of the Battle Force. Previous aviation propagandists have exaggerated the "Aviators v. Gun Club" conflict, a story line overturned by recent research that has revealed a more cooperative, less acrimonious process in developing carrier doctrine. For an example, see American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919 - 1941.
Sears also misinterprets other history. His version of a press conference held by Admiral John Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics:
Towers said, "It's the aircraft carrier that will spearhead the action in the next war." Sensing both Tower's unease and the sort of firestorm that such a statement might ignite in the Navy's Gun Club ranks and the halls of Congress, one reporter asked him to repeat (72).
Sears' reference for this exchange was Buell's Master of Sea Power: A biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. From page 343 (not 363, as cited by Sears):
"The reporters at first were silent. Finally one spoke: "Will you repeat that, Admiral."
Sears had NO FACTUAL BASIS to know what the reporter was thinking or sensing. Sears has the reporter sensing "Tower's unease" and a future "firestorm" in the "Gun Club's ranks and the halls of Congress," none of which can be drawn from Buell's text. PURE FABRICATION.
Worse, it is an inaccurate fabrication. Sears presents the statement as an attack by Towers against battleship proponents, in line with his aviators v. Gun Club theme. Such an attack was entirely out of character for Towers and inconsistent with his previous relations with surface officers. Towers was instead reacting to a crisis of an entirely different sort. There was a national shortage of machine tools. The Army Air Forces wanted to speed up the production of heavy bombers, taking priority over naval aviation for critical materials. Tower's statement to the reporters staked a claim for equality with the AAF, and was not an attack on the "Gun Club." See Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy, by Clark G. Reynolds (350 - 357).
In another story, Sears relates a tale about King's alleged dislike for Wilson Brown:
In February, when Lexington's Wilson Brown had communicated his desperate need for re-provisioning, King had...Read more›
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