Showing posts with label imperial japanese navy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label imperial japanese navy. Show all posts

Death of a navy;: Japanese naval action in World War II Review

Death of a navy;: Japanese naval action in World War II
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At first glance, Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II offers potentially unique insights into the Pacific war. Originally published in the U.S. in 1957, it is contemporaneous with works such as S.E. Morison's History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II (1947-1962) and Mitsuo Fuchida's Midway: the Battle that Doomed Japan (1955) and so documents what would still have been relatively recent events. The author, Andrieu d'Albas, was a Captain in the French Navy and (presumably) wrote from the perspective of an informed non-participant. He also, according to the dust jacket, "...spent many months of duty in postwar Japan, married a Japanese woman, speaks Japanese fluently, and knows intimately many of Japan's former top naval officers and civilian leaders" and was thus able to obtain first-person accounts from the losing side. Taken together, these traits of the book and its author should have combined to make a unique contribution to the World War II history of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Unfortunately they do not. While d'Albas correctly captures the general course of the Pacific War and its major battles, there are so many factual errors in Death of a Navy that their combined effect is to call into question d'Albas overall representation of events. For example, on p. xx of the Author's Foreword D'Albas twice refers to Japanese "two-engine bombers" in describing the attack on Pearl Harbor. (All of the Japanese aircraft involved were single-engine.) D'Albas confuses the Japanese aircraft carriers Ryujo and Ryuho for the first time on p. 47 and then adds to the confusion for the rest of the book. Someone not familiar with these ships would surely wonder how "Ryuho" was sunk at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons only to reappear at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. On p. 116, and again on p. 312, he described the Japanese Battleship Yamato's guns as being 17.9 inches in diameter. That they were 18.1 inches was well known by 1957, and yes, in this context two-tenths of an inch matters.
These errors are especially hard to explain in light of Rear Admiral R.A. Theobald's commentary (again quoting the dust jacket): "To make the picture even more complete, Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, USN, Ret., has dovetailed his own annotations into the narrative, giving corroboration and comment from the American naval viewpoint." Reading the book, however, the admiral's comments don't corroborate much. For example, how Theobald--who was Commander, Destroyers Pacific in December 1941 and present at Pearl Harbor during the attack--could have actually read the manuscript and missed the "two-engine bomber" error is hard to understand. Elsewhere, Theobald contradicts d'Albas (as on p. 193 in describing the shelling of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal) and the effect is to suggest carelessness and a real lack of concern for historical accuracy on the Author's part.
Death of a Navy is frequently cited as a reference, presumably because it is a concise history of the Pacific war and easily apprehended. A second edition was published in 1965, and that version may address and remedy the many shortcomings of the first. For my part, I'm not going to read it to find out, and I would not recommend anyone else doing so either. For those interested in a one-volume history of Japanese naval operations in World War II, Paul S. Dull's Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1978) is a better choice. Like d'Albas, Dull spoke Japanese and made extensive use of Japanese sources. Unlike d'Albas, Dull's book is well researched, accurate, complete, and worth reading. What is more, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy is still in print and a bargain compared to almost any used copy of Death of a Navy one can find for sale.


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A BATTLE HISTORY OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY (1941-1945) Review

A BATTLE HISTORY OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY (1941-1945)
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There is very little -even after 60 plus years, material on the Imperial Japanese navy written by western authors. The ones I've seen are biased, repeat cliches, or are simply inaccurate. I know now that Mitsuo Fuchida's account of Japan's failure at the battle of Midway is largely questioned, even rejected in Japan but has been the basis for many books in the western world.
Hallelujah, this author does not make mistakes like that. He took the trouble of combing through thousands of microfiched archives taken directly from the Japanese at the end of the war. His knowledge of the Japanese language is definitely a plus as he explains more than once how subtle nuances in translation between Japanese and other languages can alter the meaning of the content. This was evident in the intelligence gathered by the Americans, as the author points out.
The book starts with an explanation on how militarism had dominated Japan's politics and how even Yamamoto risked assassination over his opposition to a war with the USA. You get a flavor on what it was like to be a naval cadet or officer in the pre-war imperial navy. Dull also points out some of the misconceptions and political mistakes that the US government made that may have contributed to Japan's decision to go to war. One of the key points in the book is the statement from Admiral Nagano to none other than the emperor stating that Japan must go to war, even though it is a war she very likely will lose but a nation not willing to fight for her survival is doomed anyway.
Dull also mentions that the Japanese had some knowledge of the US Navy 'rainbow' plan, a plan crafted in case of war against Japan, in that the basic strategy was the island-hoping that later became a reality.
Every major or even medium sized engagement or operation is covered, using the Japanese name for such. For example, the battle for Savo Island is known to the other side as the First Battle of Solomon Islands. The author paints the battles, by phase, extrapolating the Japanese interpretation as well as the opposing one, resulting in the most accurate assessment possible, as each side frequently misjudges the enemy's position and intentions or actions during the heat of combat.
The text is extremely readable, you cannot put this book down. There aren't many photos but they are not missed. Dull's style flows naturally, making his a very pleasant book, and the amount of information given is simply astounding. Book is over 400 pages, but I read it in less than 5 days, it is that good. I'm now on my second pass, discovering new facts that either escaped my grasp or simply forgot. This book is a keeper, and it should form the basis for many future books on the theme.

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Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal Review

Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal
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First, the recommendation: If you read naval history books, or a WWII history buff, this is a must-read book. Hornfischer has captured the full scope of the Navy's action at Guadalcanal, within the larger picture of the whole campaign. It's a big story.
WWII buffs know Guadalcanal as the pivotal campaign where the Allies fought Japan from an offensive posture to a defensive one. Less well understood is that the US Navy made the first effective use of electronically directed fire at Guadalcanal. This created an immediate advantage for the Allies, and helped win the campaign, but stubbornness and lack of understanding of the new technology prevented it from being used to the fullest extent. Until Guadalcanal, navies still steamed in lines, attempting to "cross the T". After Guadalcanal, they started to understand how radar changed everything. This is just one of the many sub-plots that Hornfischer successfully weaves into his big picture.
The Guadalcanal campaign lasted six months. It's all here: every battle and every ship. It even feels like every shell is also here, as Hornfischer describes the damage caused by each ship's battery of 5 inch through 16 inch guns. You really get a sense of the pressure the Navy was under as each ship was sunk (including carriers, battleships, cruisers and 25 destroyers!) or retired from battle due to damage. In the end, after tremendous losses on both sides, the Japanese quit the struggle. Their ship and aircraft losses had been similar to those of the Allies, but theirs were irreplaceable, while the Allies were just starting to ramp up production of ships, aircraft, soldiers, sailors & aircrews.
Highly recommended.


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