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(More customer reviews)A few years ago I read a short book on the Pacific War written by H.P. Wilmott. For those who don't know of him, Wilmott taught at Sandhurst for many years, and is probably one of the top two or three historians of the Pacific War. At the end of the book there was an annotated bibliography. I always like this, as opposed to a regular bibliography, because the annotations tell you what the author thinks of various sources, and that in turn tells you something about his thinking. But sometimes the recommendation is more direct: you trust the author, and he tells you something is worthwhile. In this instance, he said that he wasn't sure how Pacific War historians got along before the book Kaigun was published. Needless to say I went out and got one. It's not a cheap book, there aren't used copies cheaper, there's no paperback available. It's still worth every penny, and I will tell you below why you need it.
There are, of course, a bushel and a half of books about the war in the Pacific during World War II. Many of them note that the Japanese fought the war in an unusual fashion, and most note differences in technology, strategy, tactics, and philosophy. Some of these things are vaguely explained by the differences in Western and Japanese society, but at best the explanations are vague. This leaves a huge gap in the history of the Pacific War.
Kaigun fills this gap. The authors basically explain every question of this type involving the Japanese Navy in World War II, from why their cruisers had long ranged torpedoes to why their navy's intelligence was so poor to why they insisted in planning as if the American Navy would act in particular ways (even after it had demonstrated that it would act in other ways). Much of the differences between the Japanese and American Navies stemmed from the fact that the Japanese had to modernize so quickly. This circumstance had background in that Japan had little naval tradition, and no ships really on which to base a modern navy. While this meant that Japanese Naval modernization had many pitfalls, it also had advantages, notably a lack of old traditions and hoary rivalries that plagued other nations' Naval modernization programs.
The authors spend a considerable length of time discussing Japan's wars with first China and then Russia in the early stages of their modernization. China proved little challenge in a Naval sense, but Russia was a much more formidable opponent, though the Japanese defeated them decisively. While the war itself is discussed at some length, a great deal of time is also spent discussing the aftermath, and the war's influence on Japan's strategy, tactics, and philosophy in future wars. As far as the authors are concerned, Tsushima was the principle reason the Japanese Navy spent most of the thirties planning for a major confrontation between the U.S. Navy and their own combined fleet. The latter confrontation was apparently modeled rather closely on Tsushima, which was pretty much the same strategically, though the directions and the scale were of course different.
This book is full of information, much of it not available elsewhere in English. Frankly, if you are interested in the War in the Pacific, I agree with Wilmott, adding my faint echo to his endorsement: this book is invaluable. It's also, as a side note, very well written. Highly recommended.
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Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941
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