Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)There are many books telling what happened in individual battles or to particular ships. This book tries to grade the thinking of those who determined where forces went into battle and why.
Mostly it succeeds at describing the strategic goals and thinking (or lack thereof!) of the admirals in charge of the Pacific War on both sides. Yamamoto gets failing grades for not ensuring that his brilliant and risky gambles were sufficiently followed through; King gets consistently fairly high grades; a number of characters on both sides are criticized for various flaws.
One flaw in this book is the over-use of hindsight; the author judges various strategic ideas as if everyone should have understood at the time things that did not become clear until much later; for instance, the total dominance of the aircraft carrier over the battleship, or the inability of high-altitude bombers to hit anything in motion. He several times criticizes admirals for not understanding that their cherished goal should only have been the means to an end (e.g., Ugaki's desire to take Guadalcanal) but does not realize that his somewhat repetitive chanting of "Never divide the fleet" or "Sink the carriers" are both ends toward maintaining control of the sea. (He probably should at least have looked at some of Sir Julian Corbett's criticisms of Mahan's work.)
That said, there are many excellent gems of observation, and quite a lot of good analysis, in the book. To experienced naval strategists, they will come as no surprise; to the vast majority of the human race and Pacific War buffs who are not, this will be a very useful learning course. Readers will probably want some previous acquaintance with the history of World War II in the Pacific, but given such acquaintance this is a challenging and rewarding analysis.
Highly recommended.
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