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(More customer reviews)This book is a history of the U.S. Navy between 1890, when Alfred Thayer Mahan published "The Influence of Seapower Upon History," and 1990, when the Cold War ended. "The central thesis of this book, that the Navy, as any other agent of the government, is the instrument of national policy, its junior partner in every regard, and to dissociate itself from the broad national proposition is to disassociate itself from the source of its purpose and its strength" (p. 415).
The problem, as Baer explains, is that the political leadership--particularly in the first half of these hundred years--often failed to provide any guidance. The admirals of the USN muddled on as best they could, deducing policy from public statements of their civilian masters. War Plan Orange, a document that was constantly revised during the first half of the twentieth century, was the plan for going to war with Japan. Although it is easy to misinterpret the War Plan as a master blueprint for World War II, it was a USN document and developed without consulting the U.S. Army. It was not part of any national security strategy. That it ended up influencing the outcome of the Pacific Theater is a testament mainly to the analytical impact the document and related war games and other exercise had on the service.
Baer's account is broad. Most of his focus is on years of peace and the strategic application of sea power: roughly one-third focuses on events prior to World War II, another third to that conflict, and a final third to the Cold War years. He understands the nuance of strategy, foreign policy, and technological advances. The battleship dominated interwar planning not because of some linger sentimental attachment on the part of senior officers, but because it was the best and most accurate way of delivering firepower across big stretches of water. The aircraft carriers were still weapons systems in development at this time and the U.S. Navy turned to them in desperation only after December 7, 1941. In fact, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the stronger service during most of the 1930s and U.S. naval officers warned--with good reason--for that decade and as late as 1941 that they could very well lose to the Japanese. The USN got stronger only as the American economy grew recovered from the Great Depression, which gave the service the additional ships and men that it needed to fulfill its mission. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State were more concerned with political issues, than these operational matters, and were basically writing checks that the United States could not cash, at least for a year or two.
When war came Roosevelt was trying to do as much as was possible, but the Japanese were in a position to win the war had they had a better understanding of the indirect ramifications of seapower. Their mistakes, as much as American actions, were responsible for the outcome of the war. Baer gives proportional focus to naval operations in the Atlantic and is even more critical of German efforts, but does not forgive U.S. admirals for making mistakes about convoy protection that gave the enemy some easy victories.
Despite this massive victory, the USN lost its way during the Cold War years. Admirals thought the need for a strong navy was self-evident and were unable to coordinate the Navy's missions to national security strategy. The service was out of step with each succeeding administration. The number of ships shrank dramatically in the late 1960s and 1970s and the USN made a modest comeback at best during the Reagan years before the Cold War ended.
Baer's analysis and writing are impressive. This book is a serious one that many, many people interested in naval history and national security strategy should read, but the author's skills as a writer make it an enjoyable experience as well.
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One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990
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